LAW AND MORAL JUSTIFICATION
In: Kriterion, Jg. 61 (2020), Heft 145, S. 55-72
Online
academicJournal
Zugriff:
ABSTRACT Many prominent legal philosophers believe that law makes some type of moral claim in virtue of its nature. Although the law is not an intelligent agent, the attribution of a claim to law does not need to be as mysterious as some theorists believe. It means that law-making and law- applying acts are intelligible only in the light of a certain presupposition, even if a lawmaker or a law-applier subjectively disbelieves the content of that presupposition. In this paper, I aim to clarify what type of moral claim would be suitable for law if law were to make a claim to be morally justified. I then argue that legal practice is perfectly intelligible without moral presuppositions - that is, that the law does not necessarily make moral claims.
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LAW AND MORAL JUSTIFICATION
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Autor/in / Beteiligte Person: | Faggion, Andrea |
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Zeitschrift: | Kriterion, Jg. 61 (2020), Heft 145, S. 55-72 |
Veröffentlichung: | Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, 2020 |
Medientyp: | academicJournal |
ISSN: | 0100-512X (print) ; 0100-512x (print) |
DOI: | 10.1590/0100-512x2020n14503af |
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